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THE IMPACT OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
REFORMS ON PUBLIC SERVANTS’ ETHICS: 
TOWARDS A THEORY
JEROEN MAESSCHALCK
Recent years have witnessed an increasing concern about the impact of New Public
Management (NPM) reforms on public servants’ ethics. The academic literature
about this topic is still characterized by considerable confusion and the article proposes
a falsifiable theory as a way out of this. Specifically, it demonstrates that, when all
the claims in the literature are translated into the proposed conceptual framework,
they amount to an integrated set of propositions (that is, a theory) about the causal
relationship between organizational processes (as changed by NPM-reforms) and
public servants’ ethics. Such an integrated theory is possible because, although the
normative positions taken by the authors are clearly rival ones, their empirical claims
are complementary. With the diverse claims thus integrated into one theory, the arti-
cle provides a basis for empirical research and for the NPM-ethics debate to proceed
in a more explicit and systematic way.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing sense among the public in western democracies as well
as among some public administration scholars (Chapman 1994; Chapman
and O’Toole 1995; Frederickson 1999) that corruption by public servants is
increasing. Others express doubts about such an increase (for example,
Gilman 1999), but both the academic public administration literature (for
example, Van Wart 1998; Hondeghem 1998; Van Wart and Berman 1999)
and the more practice-oriented literature (for example, OECD 1996, 2000)
seem to agree that there is a significant shift in public service ethical standards
and, subsequently, in (un)ethical behaviour.
Many of those seeking to account for this shift refer to various aspects of
the recent changes in the public sector that have come to be known as public
management reform in general (maintain, modernize, marketize, minimize;
see Bouckaert and Pollitt (2000)) and ‘New Public Management’ (NPM)
more specifically. NPM, to say the least, is a highly contested concept. It
refers to reforms that have become popular in many OECD countries during
the 1980s and 1990s of the previous century. These reforms included quan-
gotization, the introduction of performance management systems, more
responsibility and accountability for public managers, more competition in
the public sector, the introduction of quality management techniques, and
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so on (Hood 1991, 1994; Bouckaert and Pollitt 2000). The term NPM has been
coined by Christopher Hood (1991, 1994) who conceived of it as a set of
administrative doctrines, that is, ‘specific ideas about what should be done
in administration’ (Hood and Jackson 1991, p. 12). These doctrines amount,
according to Hood, to an administrative philosophy that has come to be
widely accepted.
The apprehension for the potentially negative impact of these reforms on
the ethics of public servants has been strengthened by highly publicized scandals
in many OECD countries. Many of these examples are about individuals
behaving unethically and often also illegally and causing their public sector
organization financial and other difficulties, for example, Robert Citron in
Orange County, California (Cohen and Eimicke 1999) or George Brouwer in
the Dutch Province of South Holland (Yesilkagit and de Vries 2002). The
assumption is that the NPM-type rhetoric and reforms provided these
individuals not only with the opportunity to do this but also with the moral
mindset to justify it. NPM-type reforms are also alleged to lead to more
collective or even systemic unethical behaviour. A case in point are the per-
verse effects of performance management systems. Van Reeth (2002, referring
to US Senate (1991, p. 119)), for example, reports that the direct link between
outcome measures and resource allocation in the Employment and Training
Administration of the US Department of Labor had produced ‘creaming
strategies’ such as focusing training on the most job-ready applicants.
The answer of public administration scholars to these scandals and to the
more general concerns about the impact of the reforms on (un)ethical behav-
iour of public servants is very diverse. Roughly summarized, the literature
about the impact of NPM-reforms on the ethics of public servants (henceforth
‘the NPM-ethics’ literature) consists of four rival positions, each proposing
their own administrative doctrines for ethics management in the public sec-
tor. Three of these positions are rooted in a broader administrative philoso-
phy in the sense of Hood and Jackson (1991).
The first position is anchored in the NPM administrative philosophy.
Sometimes NPM-proponents emphasize how competition mechanisms can
reduce corruption, for example, by lessening the opportunities of public
servants to corruptly charge monopoly rents (Klitgaart 1988, p. 43). More
often, however, they remain silent on the topic of ethics (Menzel 2000). The
assumption seems to be that ethical behaviour will naturally follow from an
implementation of NPM-reforms. Ethical behaviour is then mainly under-
stood as behaviour that strengthens ‘the three E’s’ (economy, efficiency and
effectiveness).
The second position is at the other side of the spectrum. It is rooted in
‘Traditional Public Administration’ (TPA), also referred to as the ‘old public
administration’ (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000) or the ‘orthodox model’ (Fox
2001, p. 109). The basic administrative doctrine of TPA with regards to ethics
management prescribes that the organizational processes be organized in
such a way that ‘the individual ethical choice is limited to choosing to follow
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the rules (the ethical thing to do) or to violate them by commission or
omission (unethical acts)’ (Fox 2001, p. 110). In the NPM-ethics debate the
proponents of TPA have, according to one observer, ‘throw[n] up their
hands in horror at recent trends, seeing them as marking the destruction of
the public service ethos’ (Greenaway 1995). Greenaway himself refers to
Chapman and O’Toole (Chapman 1994, 1998; Chapman and O’Toole 1995)
for the UK, who express ‘a traditional view in a period of change’ (Chapman
and O’Toole 1995) and argue for a return to the traditional civil service ethos
and to the traditional concept of ‘public duty’ (ibid., p. 11). Writing from the
US context, Frederickson (1993, 1997, 1999) also forcefully expresses his
concerns about the ethical consequences of NPM innovations such as mar-
ketizing, privatizing or contracting-out and he argues for a ‘re-regulation’
(Frederickson 1999, p. 276). One particularly prominent strand in the TPA-
tradition emphasizes the legal point of view and criticizes NPM ‘for its
sometimes cavalier treatment of the rule of law, especially its free and easy
slogans about eliminating red tape and letting managers manage’ (Rohr
2002, p. xi) (see, for example, Newland 1994; Moe and Gilmour 1995; Cooper
2000; Rosenbloom, Carroll and Carroll 2000).
The third position is derived from what has recently been labelled the
‘New Public Service’ (NPS) (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000). Skidmore (1995)
describes a similar approach as the ‘classical’ or ‘Aristotelian’ mode of
organizing (referring to its roots in MacIntyre’s work), while others (for
example, Fox and Miller 1996) have labelled this the ‘communitarian/citizen
alternative.’ Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) present the NPS approach as a
viable third alternative for the observed dichotomy between ‘the old public
administration’ and ‘the New Public Management’. Rather than traditional
bureaucracies that are controlled from the top down and largely closed for
citizens, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) propose new mechanisms in which
‘the primary role of the public servant is to help citizens articulate and meet
their shared interests rather than to attempt to control or steer society’
(p. 549). They build inter alia on the communitarian tradition, which has
acquired a strong position in public administration through the work of
Terry Cooper (see the review of Fox (2001, p. 122)). As for the NPM-ethics
debate, those writing from a NPS point of view largely join the TPA-advo-
cates in their negative assessment of the ethical consequences of NPM-
reforms, but propose a different solution. Again, Denhardt and Denhardt
(2000) summarize the argument. They argue that public sector organizations
should be organized in such a way that public servants are not responsive to
‘constituents and clients’ (TPA), nor to ‘customers’ (NPM), but to ‘citizens’.
Several other authors have criticized NPM from a NPS point of view.
Although he also used TPA-arguments to criticize NPM, most of Frederickson’s
prescriptive claims (particularly in The Spirit of Public Administration (1997))
rather correspond to the NPS administrative philosophy. One example of
this is his plea for a ‘combination of patriotism (the love of the regime
values) with benevolence (the love of others)’ (p. 202). Gawthrop (1998) fits
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the NPS philosophy even more neatly. He contrasts the ‘democratic spirit’ with
the NPM-type ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and emphasizes that the former should
prevail. He also strongly criticizes the TPA-type ‘ethics of compliance’ that
he observed in US public administration over the past five decades (p. 153)
for leading to a soulless public administration, obsessed with procedural
correctness. He argues that public servants should have a personal responsi-
bility, with ‘service as the centre of value’ (p. 80). The choice for a career as
public servant implies ‘opting for a career of service to the public, to the
citizenry, to one’s neighbours’ (p. 23).
The fourth position in the debate does not clearly build on a single identi-
fiable administrative philosophy like the previous three. Its central argu-
ment is that public sector ethics management is an important and evolving
subfield of public management, which deserves its own set of doctrines,
hence the ‘Ethics Management’ approach. Its core doctrine is that an ethics
policy should be a combination of doctrines from the three aforementioned
approaches, adapted to the specific circumstances of the organization.
Admittedly, arguments for a combination of different approaches have been
articulated before. Cooper, for example, proposed such a combined
approach in his seminal The Responsible Administrator (1st edn, 1982). How-
ever, the success of the NPM-discourse and the concomitant ethical concerns
fostered a recent revival of this approach. The Public Management (PUMA)
department of the OECD (1996, 2000) has been among its most prominent
promoters, together with practice-oriented academics such as Gilman (1999)
or Uhr (1999). These and other recent proponents agree with the NPM-
advocates that NPM-reforms can have many beneficial consequences, but
are at the same time conscious of the undesirable effects (that is, unethical
behaviour). However, in contrast with TPA and NPS, their solution is not to
do away with NPM innovations, but to complement them with a well-
developed public sector ethics management that is adapted to the reforms.
They see two possible approaches to such an ethics policy: the compliance
or ‘low road’ (Rohr 1978) and the integrity or ‘high road’ (ibid.) approach.
The former ‘focuses on strict compliance with descriptive administrative
procedures, control mechanisms and detailed rules ( . . . )’ (OECD 2000, p. 25),
and hence comes very close to the ethics management doctrines of TPA. The
‘Ethics Management’ proponents observe, however, that this compliance
approach does not fit the NPM-style results-based managerial approach. It
thus violates their basic doctrine of a management style adapted to the
circumstances. Instead, NPM-type changes need to be complemented by an
‘integrity’ approach to ethics management that is ‘based on aspirations,
relies on incentives and encourages good behaviour rather than policing
and punishing errors and wrongdoing’ (ibid.). This claim is warranted on
the ground that the increased discretion that goes with the reduction of hier-
archy in NPM-reforms needs to be paralleled by an ethics management style
that supports the public servants in dealing with this discretion, rather than
limiting their discretion by developing new rules and control systems.
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This fourfold answer offered by the public administration literature remains
rather unsatisfying. A public administrationist who consider implementing
NPM-reforms, while at the same time wanting to avoid undesirable ethical
consequences, is probably even more confused after reading through this
literature. Who should he or she believe? The participants in the debate do
make use of examples to support their claims. Yet, when all these claims are
put together, they turn out to be quite contradictory, formulated in very
different languages and traditions and without much systematic referencing
to each other. At least three reasons can account for these limitations in the
NPM-ethics literature. First, a large part of these texts feature in a broader
debate ‘for or against’ NPM, which often blurs the distinction between the
authors’ empirical and normative claims where these could have been
separated. Second, the issue of the ethical consequences of NPM only really
surfaced when the NPM-reforms were introduced, in countries like the US,
the UK, Australia or New Zealand. Hence, this ‘area’ of research is young,
which accounts for the limited systematic work that has been done hitherto.
Similarly, in the literature on the causes of NPM, it took some time for
conceptual clarity to emerge (Barzelay 2001). Finally, possibly even more
than other public administration issues, this issue really rests on the crossing
points of very diverse theoretical traditions, ranging from organization
theory (for example, the organization culture literature) through political
science and public administration to moral philosophy. This as well helps to
account for the conceptual confusion.
With this conceptual disarray in mind, and at this point of the debate, it is
more important to aim for a coherent theory than to provide yet another set
of examples that supports any of the empirical claims made in the literature.
Specifically, this article’s aim is to suggest a solution for the conceptual
confusion and to develop a falsifiable theory about the causal relationship
between NPM-reforms and the ethics of public servants. This theory is
intended to provide the framework for further empirical testing of the
claims in the literature. Hence, it intends to encompass the claims in the
literature, while still being coherent. I will argue that such an integrated
theory is possible because, although the normative positions taken by the
authors are clearly rival, their empirical claims are complementary. This
argument will be developed in three steps. First, a conceptual framework
will be presented, into which the diverse claims in the literature can later be
translated. Since the eventual theory will have to be testable, this conceptual
framework will use existing typologies that have proven to be empirically
meaningful and useful. The second section will then bring this conceptual
framework to life, by developing it into a theory, that is, a set of falsifiable
empirical propositions. With the conceptual framework consisting of typ-
ologies, those propositions will link particular types with each other. The
theoretical foundation for this theory will be ‘cultural theory’ or ‘grid-group
theory’ as developed by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990). The third
section will then link the proposed conceptual framework and theory with
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the NPM-ethics literature. It will particularly be shown that, when the
claims made in the NPM-ethics literature are translated into the language of
the conceptual framework, they parallel the propositions of the presented
theory. With the diverse claims thus translated into one conceptual frame-
work and integrated into one theory, the ambition of the article is to provide
a framework for empirical research and, more generally, for the NPM-ethics
discussion to proceed in a more explicit and systematic way.
PROPOSING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above, the authors in the NPM-ethics literature do not simply
present their administrative doctrines, but also provide justifications,
consisting of empirical claims. Essentially they argue that their favourite
doctrines lead to ethical decision making, while the doctrines they disapprove
of foster unethical behaviour. This section aims to present a conceptual
framework that is able to bring these diverse claims together.
The core variables of the conceptual framework are presented in figure 1.
This framework is inspired by Vidaver-Cohen (1998), but significantly
departs from it. The relationship between the core variables can be summar-
ized as follows. Organizational processes are organizational stimuli that
‘signal’ (Vidaver-Cohen 1998) expectations for ethical decision making and
unethical behaviour. Ethical decision making and unethical behaviour are a
response to these stimuli. The individual variables and the environment are
included in the framework as control variables but are not the main focus of
interest. The framework and the theory that will be based on it (see below)
assume a reciprocal causal relationship between these variables, as expressed
through the bi-directional arrows in figure 1 (and later in table 3). The NPM-
ethics literature, emphasizing the impact of the organization on public
servants’ ethics, focuses on one direction and so does the title of the present
article. An expansion of this towards reciprocal causality is feasible, how-
ever. To mention just one example of a causal effect in the other direction,
organizations might learn from particular instances of unethical behaviour
FIGURE 1 Conceptual framework
Environment outside the organization 
Individual variables 
Organizational
processes Unethical behaviour 
Ethical decision making 
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(‘ethics failures’ (see Zajac 1996)), and adapt their organizational processes.
The following subsections will now briefly operationalize each of the main
elements of the conceptual framework: organizational processes, ethical
decision making, and unethical behaviour.
Organizational processes
Those arguing against NPM propose their own alternative for it. Hence,
figure 1 does not explicitly mention ‘NPM’, but refers to ‘organizational
processes’ in a more general sense. These ‘organizational processes’ organ-
ize the interactions in an organization in a particular way. Three ‘types of
interaction patterns’ are distinguished: hierarchy, individualism and egali-
tarianism. This typology is essentially based on the ‘grid-group theory’ or
‘cultural theory’ that was developed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas
(1978) and later applied to political science (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky
1990) and to public management (Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Hood 1998).
Central to the theory are the types, which have been conceived of as
‘cultural biases’, ‘cosmologies’, ‘ways of organizing’, etc. For our purposes
we conceive of them as ‘interaction patterns’ and concentrate on the three
‘active’ types, which broadly correspond to the types of other classic typ-
ologies (for example, Ouchi (1980), Petrick and Quinn (1997) and Hirschman
(1970)). The discussion will thus exclude grid-group theory’s fourth and
‘passive’ interaction type ‘fatalism’. For although it is important as an
empirical category, it is not endorsed or defended by any of the authors in
the prescriptive NPM-ethics literature.
Typical for the hierarchist interaction pattern is the strong emphasis on
classifications, roles, rules and procedures: ‘individuals in this social context
are subject to both the control of other members in the group and the
demands of socially imposed roles. ( . . . ) The exercise of authority (and
inequality more generally) is justified on the grounds that different roles for
different people enable people to live together more harmoniously than
alternative arrangements’ (Thompson et al. 1990, p. 6). This is the preferred
interaction pattern of the advocates of the Traditional Public Administration
administrative philosophy. The egalitarian interaction pattern, on the other hand,
emphasizes the boundaries of the group and aims at equality within the group,
‘not equality of material conditions but equality of power relations. No one,
in an egalitarian way of life, has the right to tell another what to do or what to
be’ (ibid., pp. 156–7). The administrative doctrines of the New Public Service
philosophy demonstrate a strong preference for this egalitarian interaction
type. Third, the individualist interaction pattern creates a strongly competitive
environment in which power relations will differ, not because of tradition or
formal organization as in hierarchy, but as a consequence of the constant
competition. This interaction pattern is preferred by the NPM-adherents.
Thus, although more developed versions of each of the three administra-
tive philosophies do consider several interaction types, they each have a
clear preference for one particular type. Only the fourth approach
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mentioned above explicitly combines the three interaction patterns: the
ethics management approach presents the compliance (hierarchist) and
integrity (egalitarian) approaches to ethics management as complements for
the existing and generally accepted NPM-measures (individualism).
Public sector ethics
Having defined organizational processes, we can now turn to the other side
of the arrow: the ethics of public servants. This is operationalized as ‘ethical
decision making’ and ‘unethical behaviour’ (rather than, for example,
‘ethical and unethical decision making’ or ‘ethical and unethical behaviour’)
because this parallels the usual operationalizations in the organizational
ethics literature and in the NPM-ethics literatures. As for the former, there is
a strong tradition of empirical research into both ‘ethical decision making’
(see for example Fritzsche and Becker 1984; Trevino 1986; Hunt and
Vazquez-Parraga 1993; Stewart and Sprinthall 1993; Sims and Keon 1999;
Stewart et al. 2001) and ‘unethical behaviour’ (see for example Akaah 1992;
McNeil and Peachment 1996; Kaptein 1998). Specifically, both variables will
be operationalized by means of a typology that has been used and tested
extensively in the organizational ethics literature (for a recent overview, see
Agarwal and Malloy 1999). Using this existing typology allows for an
empirically sound operationalization of the variables and thus facilitates
future empirical testing of the propositions.
Ethical decision making
The conceptualization of ethical decision making is based on the typology that
was developed by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) to describe different ‘ethical
climates’. Here, it is not used to classify ethical climates, but to classify ‘ethical
standards’, that is, prescriptions about the way public servants should reason
in ethical situations. The theoretical typology of Victor and Cullen (see table 1)
has two dimensions, each with three positions. The dimension ‘ethical cri-
terion’ refers to three major classes of ethical theory that can also be found in
Kohlberg’s widely known theory of moral development (see for example
Kohlberg 1984; Stewart, Sprinthall and Shafer 2001): egoism, benevolence and
principle. The dimension ‘locus of analysis’ refers to the main referent group
that identifies ‘the source of moral reasoning used for applying ethical criteria
to organisational decisions and/or the limits on what would be considered in
ethical analyses of organisational decisions’ (Victor and Cullen 1988, p. 105).
The individual locus of analysis identifies the sources of ethical reasoning
within the individual. The local locus of analysis identifies sources of ethical
reasoning at the level of the organization. The cosmopolitan locus locates the
referent for ethical reasoning outside the organization. Together, the ethical
criterion dimension and the locus of analysis dimension identify nine ethical
standards. The nine types in table 1 are largely based on the typology of Victor
and Cullen, but their definition is somewhat adapted to the public sector and
to the purposes of this conceptual framework.
IMPACT OF NPM REFORMS ON PUBLIC SERVANTS’ ETHICS 473
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
The ‘egoism criterion’ is focused on maximizing self-interest, which is
defined in a narrow, instrumental and economic sense of immediate inter-
est. The loci of analysis identify the particular ‘self’ of which the interests are
maximized: the individual, the organization and society. Each of them is
considered as ‘a reified, indivisible unit that can be understood to have
needs and preferences’ (Victor and Cullen 1988, pp. 106–7).
Those who apply the ‘benevolence criterion’ on the other hand, typically
make teleological considerations of the consequences of their actions. People
applying this criterion do not think of themselves as being part of a single,
reified self of which the interests should be maximized, but they make a
distinction between the subject and the object of ethical behaviour and con-
sider the consequences of their behaviour for the well-being of others. The
locus of analysis identifies the relevant object of these considerations. When
applying the ‘friendship’ standard, people consider other people without any
reference to organizational membership. At the local level, the benevolence
criterion is defined as ‘consideration of the organisational collective (e.g.
esprits de corps, team play)’ (ibid., p. 107): the team interest standard. At the
cosmopolitan level people consider the consequences of their actions for
stakeholders outside the organization. Public servants applying this ‘stake-
holder orientation’ standard in moral reasoning consider the consequences of
their actions for their clients as far as they can conceive of these. They will not
consider the consequences of their actions for inconceivable and ‘intangible’
groups such as ‘the electorate’, ‘the taxpayers’ or ‘the wider public’.
People applying the ‘principle criterion’ make a deontological consider-
ation of laws, rules and principles when dealing with ethical issues. The loci of
analysis then identify the sources from which the principles can be derived.
At the individual level, the personal morality standard prescribes that people
in an organization follow their own principles and rules when they are
confronted with an ethical problem. At the local level, the source of the princi-
ples lies within the organization. This is the typical rule-following standard
that is often assumed to dominate in classical bureaucratic organizations. At
the cosmopolitan locus, the source of the principles is outside the immediate
TABLE 1 Nine ethical standards
Locus of analysis/
ethical criterion
Individual Local Cosmopolitan
Egoism Self-interest
(1)
Organizational interest
(2)
Efficiency
(3)
Benevolence Friendship
(4)
Team interest
(5)
Stakeholder orientation
(6)
Principle Personal morality
(7)
Organizational rules
(8)
Laws and public interest
(9)
Source: adapted from Victor and Cullen 1988, with permission.
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organization. This standard prescribes that people refer to extra-organizational
sources to justify ethically sensitive decisions. These include laws and codes
but also general principles such as justice, equity, neutrality, and so on. For
this reason, in table 1, cell 9, ‘public interest’ is mentioned specifically.
Unethical behaviour
‘Ethical decision making’ refers to complex and difficult ethical dilemma situ-
ations where people usually perceive it to be very difficult to judge what
ethical behaviour is. The second subvariable ‘unethical behaviour’ refers to
behaviour that most people would reasonably judge to be unethical. Obvi-
ously, ‘unethical behaviour’ is a very ambiguous term that leaves much
scope for bias. Rather than trying to completely avoid bias, this conceptual
framework makes it explicit by defining ‘unethical behaviour’ as ‘the
excessive use of one of the nine ethical standards’. In other words, it refers to
a too radical (and therefore misunderstood) application of this standard. In
table 2, I have reframed the criteria in Victor and Cullen (1988 – see table 1,
above), to provide descriptions of the excessive use of the corresponding
standards.
The first line in table 2 refers to the three types of unethical behaviour in
which self-interest is maximized. The unethical behaviour on the second
line, on the other hand, is intended to benefit others, without the explicit
demand of an immediate and proportional return. This unethical behaviour
is motivated on grounds of mutual trust and consequentialist considerations
of the positive effect on the other. In terms of the bottom line, cell 7 stands
out as a particular category. Unethical behaviour here includes explicit dis-
obedience of rules, laws and orders: anarchy. Cells 8 and 9 both refer to an
excessive use of the deontological way of ethical reasoning.
PROPOSING A THEORY
With the elements of the conceptual framework defined and operationalized,
we can now propose the actual theory, starting with the basic proposition,
TABLE 2 Nine types of unethical behaviour
Locus of analysis/
ethical criterion
Individual Local Cosmopolitan
Egoism Selfishness (corruption
sensu stricto)
(1)
Organization-fetishism
(2)
Efficiency-fetishism
(3)
Benevolence Nepotism
(4)
Team-fetishism
(5)
Preferential treatment
of stakeholders
(6)
Principle Anarchy
(7)
Rule-fetishism
(8)
Law-, and principle-
fetishism
(9)
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an empirically falsifiable claim. The relative intensity of the interaction
types, is proportional:
• to the relative intensity of the respectively related ethical standards in
ethical decision making; and
• to the relative frequency of occurrence of the respectively related types
of unethical behaviour.
In other words, when a particular interaction type is dominant, then the
concomitant ethical standard will be dominant in ethical decision making
and thus the chance will increase that the standard will be applied exces-
sively (that is, unethical behaviour, see above). This proposition is based on
two fundamental claims, each of which are central to ‘grid-group theory’,
which also provided the typology for organizational processes (see above).
First, the proposition is based on grid-group theory’s basic claim that in any
organizational setting there is always a mutually supportive relationship
between the structure of the organization and the dominant values and
beliefs (Thompson et al. 1990; Hood 1998). A certain type of structure (or set
of social relations) will tend to go together with a certain set of values and
beliefs (or cultural bias). Grid-group theorists call this ‘the compatibility
condition’ (Thompson et al. 1990, p. 2). Only a certain combination of types
of values and social relations provides a reasonably stable and ‘viable’
organization. With ‘organizational processes’ being similar to grid-group
theory’s ‘social relations’, and ‘ethical decision making standard’ and ‘type
of unethical behaviour’ being equivalent to ‘cultural bias’, it is clear how
grid-group theory provides the theoretical support for the proposition
specified above. Second, grid-group theory also provided support for the
claim that, when an interaction pattern is dominant, the chance of the
unethical behaviour associated with this interaction pattern occurring
increases. Grid-group theorists argue that the different interaction patterns
depend upon each other to make up for their deficiencies (Thompson et al.
1990). The theory presented here, defines ‘deficient consequence of an inter-
action type’ as the unethical behaviour that is hypothesized to be causally
associated with it. According to grid-group theory, this can only be dealt
with by reducing the dominance of that interaction pattern by applying
other patterns and thus ensuring more balance between the interaction
patterns. Organizations that are able to establish such a volatile ‘coalition’
between the four interaction types (including ‘fatalism’) have been called
‘clumsy institutions’ (Thompson 2002). Hence, the prescriptive bias behind
both grid-group theory and the presented theory is that unethical behaviour
can be avoided by ensuring that the different interaction types are suffi-
ciently represented so that the critical voice of each type will be heard and
no interaction type will dominate.
Table 3 specifies the associations between the respective types. The propo-
sitions (‘P’) can be summarized as follows. Each of the three interaction
types is associated with one of the three ethical criteria (individualism
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with egoism, egalitarianism with benevolence, and hierarchy with principle)
and hence with the respective ethical standards and types of unethical
behaviour. There is one exception to this general rule: the personal morality
standard is defined by the principle criterion, but is associated in table 3
with the egalitarian interaction pattern (and not the hierarchist interaction
pattern).
TOWARDS A THEORY ABOUT THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN NPM AND PUBLIC SERVANTS’ ETHICS
This section translates the propositions that underlie the positions in the
NPM-ethics debate into the language of the conceptual framework that was
presented in section 1. It will demonstrate that each of the propositions
formulated in the NPM-ethics debate is paralleled by a proposition set out
in table 3. Thus, the propositions that seemed rival are actually complement-
ary and, once they are all put into the same ‘language’, they amount to one
coherent theory. Hence, the aim of this paragraph is not to collect empirical
data, but to bring the diverse empirical claims made in the NPM-ethics litera-
ture together in one theory. This then provides the conceptual clarity and
theoretical framework that are necessary for systematic empirical testing of
those propositions.
First, the three propositions (see arrows in table 3) about the causal rela-
tionship between ‘organizational processes’ and ‘ethical decision making’ will
be discussed. Each of these will turn out to have strong advocates in the
NPM-ethics literature. Then, the relationship between organizational processes
and ‘unethical behaviour’ (through ethical decision making) will be addressed.
Again, the NPM-ethics literature provides strong underpinnings for each of
these propositions, but now presented by the opponents of the respective
interaction types.
TABLE 3 The theory’s propositions
Organizational
processes
Dominant standard in
ethical decision making
Dominant type of unethical
behaviour
Individualism P1 Self-interest/
organizational
interest/efficiency
P4 Selfishness/organization-
fetishism/efficiency-
fetishism
Egalitarianism
P2a 
P2b
Friendship/team 
interest/stakeholder
orientation
Personal morality
P5a 
P5b
Nepotism/team-fetishism 
preferential treatment of 
stakeholders
Anarchy
Hierarchy P3 Organizational rules/
laws
and public interest
P6 Rule-fetishism/law- and
principle-fetishism
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The causal relationship between organizational processes and ethical 
decision making
Proposition 1: there is a reciprocal causal relationship between individ-
ualism and the following standards: self-interest (table 1, cell 1), organiza-
tional interest (table 1, cell 2), and efficiency (table 1, cell 3).
The strongest support for the claim that the individualist interaction pattern
leads to the (‘ethically desirable’) standards of self-interest (table 1, cell 1),
organizational interest (table 1, cell 2) and efficiency (table 1, cell 3) can, of
course, be found in NPM. This administrative philosophy can be divided
into two subsets of administrative doctrines, congruent with the two phases
in the reform movement (at least in the UK and the US) that have been
observed by Pollitt (1993) and others. In a first phase the NPM-reforms were
focused on neo-Taylorian changes aimed at cost-cutting and the introduc-
tion of the individualist interaction pattern in government. One of the most
important intellectual sources of this administrative philosophy is the public
choice school, which borrowed the core assumption from economic theory
that human beings (including public servants) are self-interested utility
maximizers. The challenge then is to organize the organizational processes
in such a way that this self-interested behaviour still leads to a well-perform-
ing government that ‘works better and costs less’ (Gore 1996). The only interac-
tion type that is really capable of doing this is, according to the NPM-
adherents, the individualist way. The introduction of a competitive pay for
performance scheme, for example, will lead to the domination of the self-
interest standard (table 1, cell 1) in ethical decision making, which, in turn,
will have a positive effect on government performance; at least on the con-
dition that the public servants under the scheme compete on the basis of ‘the
right’ performance indicators. When a public sector organization competes
with other (private or public sector) organizations, this will lead to the
efficiency standard (table 1, cell 3) dominating ethical decision making, or in
some cases the organizational interest standard (table 1, cell 2).
The second phase in the reform movement has been described as ‘the
coming of quality’ (Pollitt 1993) or the ‘soft path’ (Lynn, cited in deLeon
1998, p. 540). It marks a move away from the ‘bureaucrat-bashing’ and cost-
cutting focus of the early NPM-years towards an emphasis on quality and
customer service orientation. The empirical claims of the authors writing in
this ‘quality’ strand of the NPM literature are somewhat ambiguous. Their
rhetoric usually contains some references to direct democracy or citizen
involvement (that is, egalitarianism), but the actual proposals (and their
actual implementation) mostly contain individualist elements: improving
quality of services in order to increase profits and as long as the organization
benefits from it. In the language of the framework, the quality movement
proponents claim that the introduction of quality-oriented measures will
lead to a domination of both the stakeholder orientation standard (table 1, cell 6)
and the organizational interest (table 1, cell 2) and efficiency (table 1, cell 3)
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standards, but in practice, they concentrate on the latter two (for the British
case, see for example Bellamy and Greenaway (1995)).
Proposition 2: there is a reciprocal causal relationship between egalitari-
anism and the following standards: (a) friendship (cell 4); team interest
(table 1, cell 5) and stakeholder orientation (table 1, cell 6); and (b) per-
sonal morality (table 1, cell 7).
Not surprisingly, the most forceful support for the proposition that the
egalitarian interaction pattern leads to the types of ethical decision making
listed in this second proposition, is provided by doctrines of the NPS admin-
istrative philosophy. Two other approaches also provide some support
for specific claims, but only partially so since they would always argue to
complement the egalitarian measures with their own preferred interaction
pattern. I discuss each in turn.
First, as mentioned above, the NPM doctrines about service and quality
management contain some egalitarian elements and these are assumed to
lead public servants to use the stakeholder orientation standard (table 1, cell
6) in their ethical decision making. The potential unethical behaviour associ-
ated with this standard (preferential treatment of stakeholders) should, in
the NPM-logic, be avoided by combining this with a competitive interaction
pattern that guarantees that the efficiency standard will counterbalance the
stakeholder orientation. Similarly, within the organization, quality manage-
ment doctrines also sometimes assume the positive effects of ‘team-work’
and other egalitarian interaction patterns (Osborne and Gaebler 1992;
Nufrio 2001, pp. 14–15), but again counterbalance these with competition
mechanisms that focus on the individual (not always making explicit the
tension between both interaction types).
Second, the ‘integrity’ approach of the Ethics Management adherents also
contains a strong element of egalitarianism. The hypothesis is that more
egalitarianism will lead people to reason on the basis of the personal moral-
ity standard (table 1, cell 7), which is considered to be a desirable comple-
ment for the ethical standards that follow from NPM-type individualist
interaction patterns. However, according to the ‘Ethics Management’
authors, this integrity-style ethics management by itself will not do. There is
still need for a basic set of compliance-based arrangements or, in the words
of Uhr (1999), the ‘values set’ of integrity institutions needs to be balanced
with the ‘verification set’ of institutions. Hence it is better to conceive of the
compliance and integrity approaches to ethics management as two ideal
types at the ends of a continuum, rather than as mutually exclusive catego-
ries (Gilman 1999). The Ethics Management advocates prefer a position that
is closer to the integrity approach but still contains a number of significant
compliance elements.
While the others assume that egalitarianism (when it has beneficial effects
also) always needs to be balanced by one of the other interaction types, the
NPS advocates seem to assume that egalitarianism is diverse enough to
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provide sufficient variation in itself. They make, for example, a distinction
between egalitarianism within a public sector organization and egalitarian-
ism between organizational members and outsiders. As for the latter, NPS-
proponents argue that the processes of a public sector organization need to
be designed in such a way that the public servants can ‘focus on building
relationships of trust and collaboration with and among citizens’ (Denhardt
and Denhardt 2000). The NPS advocates then hypothesize that this egalitar-
ianism between organizational members and outsiders will lead to the stake-
holder orientation standard (table 1, cell 6): public servants will consider the
consequences of their actions for the stakeholders they are confronted with,
that is, they will ‘attend to ( . . . ) citizen interests’ (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000,
p. 554). This is not sufficient, however, since this might lead to partiality and
preferential treatment of those stakeholders (table 2, cell 6). Therefore, this
should be complemented by a considerable amount of egalitarianism within
the organisation, for example, in the form of shared leadership, collabora-
tion or empowerment. These latter measures are hypothesized to have two
effects on the ethics of public servants. First, and most importantly, they will
lead to the dominance of the personal morality standard (table 1, cell 7),
because ‘leadership exercised by working through and with people trans-
forms the participants and shifts their focus to higher level values’ (ibid.,
p. 556). When this standard dominates, public servants will follow their own
principles and the continuing dialogue ad exchange of views both within
and outside the organizations will then ensure that these ‘personal principles’
will in fact be those principles that are desired by all parties. This is consistent
with the observation of many students of moral development that the level
of moral reasoning increases through an open and constructive exchange of
views (for example, the ‘Just Community approach of Kohlberg’ (1984), see
Vidaver-Cohen (1998, pp. 1212–13)). In any case, this personal morality
standard will help to ensure that public servants look beyond the immediate
interests of the stakeholders they are dealing with, and will as such reduce
the potential dangers of a too strong application of the stakeholder orientation
standard. A second implication of egalitarianism within the organization
will be mutual respect among members of the organization, that is, the
friendship (table 1, cell 4) and team interest (table 1, cell 5) ethical standards.
Proposition 3: There is a reciprocal causal relationship between hierarchy
and the following standards: organizational rules (table 1, cell 8) and laws
and public interest (table 1, cell 9).
Those arguing from the TPA philosophy essentially contend that their
hierarchist doctrines will lead to the organizational rules (table 1, cell 8) and
laws and public interest (table 1, cell 9) standards and evaluate this posi-
tively. As for hierarchy within the organization, Frederickson for example
argues that ‘in their enthusiasm for cutting red tape ( . . . ), managers should
remember why some of that red tape got there in the first place’, and he
mentions ‘due process and fairness’ and ‘compassion and protection’ as ‘just
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two reasons’ (Frederickson 1999, pp. 267–8). Confronted with de-regulation,
privatization, contracting out and other typical NPM-reforms, Frederickson
predicts that ‘in 2010 the ancient saying “today’s problems are yesterday’s
solutions” will have come to pass’ and hence a ‘step-by-step process of
re-regulation’ with ‘as primary impetus ( . . . ) the issue of fairness’ will be
inevitable (ibid., pp. 275–6). Those TPA-advocates that write from a legalis-
tic perspective take the same position and particularly emphasize the typ-
ically hierarchist argument that ‘private management’ is fundamentally
different and distinct from ‘government management’ as the latter has its
basis in and is constrained by public law (see for example, Moe and Gilmour
1995, p. 138). The TPA-proponents also argue for a hierarchist interaction
pattern with citizens, contrasting this with the customer service orientation
of NPM. They point out that the private interests of clients do not necessar-
ily coincide with the public interest and that public servants have a ‘public
duty’ (Chapman and O’Toole 1995) that goes far beyond the immediate
stakes of the stakeholder they are dealing with.
The causal relationship between organisational processes and unethical 
behaviour
This subsection lists the propositions in the NPM-ethics literature that paral-
lel the three propositions in table 3 about the relationship between inter-
action types and types of unethical behaviour (as mediated by types of
ethical decision making). In the previous subsection it was demonstrated
how the respective advocates of each of the four positions in the NPM-ethics
debate emphasized how their own preferred interaction pattern causes
ethical decision making. This subparagraph will demonstrate how they
emphasize that the interaction patterns they dislike lead to unethical behav-
iour. Since the proposed conceptual framework includes both unethical
behaviour and ethical decision making, all these claims can be integrated
into the general theory developed above and the ‘rival doctrines’ will turn
out to be surprisingly complementary.
Proposition 4: there is a reciprocal causal relationship between individ-
ualism and the following unethical behaviour types: organization fetishism
(table 2, cell 2), and efficiency-fetishism (table 2, cell 3).
Of course, most NPM-advocates are aware that individualism sometimes
causes unethical behaviour. They have two standard explanations for this.
First, they argue, individualism can lead to unethical behaviour when the
competition mechanisms are not designed in an appropriate way. Perform-
ance management systems, for example, need to be designed in such a way
that the indicators are the ‘right’ ones and that the self-interested behaviour
is guided in such a way that it also advances the government’s goals.
Second, much of the unethical behaviour that is assumed to follow from
introducing competition mechanisms is, according to the NPM-adherents,
in fact caused by the lack of actual competition. For example, an agency
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might be put at arm’s length and forced to compete with private sector com-
panies for the product it delivers to the overseeing ministry. However, when
it turns out that no private companies are interested in providing the pro-
duct, the agency will have a monopoly position. The agency might then
underperform and provide low quality products to its overseeing ministry.
This self-interested, unethical behaviour is, according to the NPM-proponents,
not a consequence of the introduction of individualism but of the actual lack
of individualism. The advocates of the other three approaches do not accept
these two explanations on the basis of two reasons, focusing on organiza-
tional processes and unethical behaviour respectively.
The first reason concentrates on the organizational processes and is most
strongly argued for by the Ethics Management advocates. Essentially, their
argument is that there are some inherent problems with applying pure indi-
vidualism in the public sector, which cannot be solved by simply improving
or enhancing competition. They develop this argument for the two ‘strands’
of NPM. First, as for the Neo-Taylorian strand or ‘Taylorism in disguise’
(Theobald 1997, p. 497), warnings abound about the inherent problems with
performance management in the public sector. Ott et al. (2001), for example,
observe that traditional hierarchical forms of accountability have been seri-
ously diminished, on the assumption that new forms of accountability, and
particularly performance measurement, are a better alternative. However,
since performance measurement has not been able (yet) to provide the infor-
mation needed in important areas of government activity, the net result of
this operation has been a diminished degree of accountability. DeLeon
(1998) is one among many who point out that these problems are, to an
extent, inherent, since ‘accountability for results is possible only where goals
are clear’ (p. 546). A second target of this type of critique have been the qual-
ity management measures of NPM, and particularly the use of individualist-
type service management techniques in the public sector and the ‘customer
service orientation’ underlying it. Brans (1997), for example, points out that
the customer concept emphasizes the ‘exit’ option as a tool to express
discontent, rather than ‘voice’. ‘It obscures, however, the fact that citizens
without resources – the willingness to pay is an important assumption of the
market metaphor – may be left without any voice at all’ (p. 406). In the
language of the conceptual framework, this implies that individualism
fosters an excessive use of the organizational interest (table 2, cell 2) and
efficiency (table 2, cell 3) standards, to the detriment of other more traditional
public sector values, such as equity. In sum, all these examples demonstrate
that competition in the public sector often turns out to work differently from
the way it was initially intended, fostering the typical types of unethical
behaviour associated with individualism. Hence, Ethics Management pro-
ponents argue, the introduction of individualism should be well-considered
and should always be complemented with measures of ethics management
that are a combination of hierarchist (‘compliance’) and egalitarian (‘integrity’)
interaction patterns.
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The second reason is partly supported by the ‘Ethics Management’ adherents
but most strongly formulated by those arguing from TPA and NPS. This
argument focuses on the ‘unethical behaviour’, rather than on the organ-
izational processes and their potential deficiencies. The contention is that
increasing competition also increases the chance that the unethical behav-
iour of cell 1, 2 and 3 will occur, not because of a badly designed competition
system (the argument of the NPM-proponents) or because competition is
impossible (Ethics Management proponents), but because competition
mechanisms change the values of public servants. Individualist organ-
izational processes almost reverse the traditional hierarchy of values (‘first
legality, then equity, effectiveness and efficiency and lastly economy’
(Bouckaert 1995, p. 170)) to one in which the latter three (‘the three E’s’)
come first. Thus the chance increases that the unethical behaviour associated
with individualism will occur. The TPA-advocates argue this most strongly,
referring to the ‘demise of public duty’ (Chapman and O’Toole 1995) as a
consequence of increased competition. Authors from the legal strand within
TPA then particularly emphasize that NPM’s individualist emphasis on
increased executive discretion sits uncomfortable with the, from a legal
point of view crucial, problem of ‘control of administrative discretion to
assure compliance with legal standards to protect the individual from arbi-
trary action or tyranny’ (Carroll 1995, p. 308). Yet, also the NPS-proponents
emphasize that ‘the public interest is the aim, not the by-product’ (Denhardt
and Denhardt 2000, p. 554). They also point at the value of the political
debate in itself, since it raises awareness of other stakeholder’ values and
interests and might even transform preferences, rather than simply aggre-
gate them, as the individualists propose (Bellamy and Greenaway 1995,
pp. 490–1).
Proposition 5: there is a reciprocal causal relationship between egalitar-
ianism and the following unethical behaviour types: team-fetishism
(table 2, cell 5) and preferential treatment of stakeholders (table 2, cell 6);
and (b) anarchy (table 2, cell 7).
While ethical criticism on the individualist interaction pattern abounds, the
concerns about unethical behaviour that might be fostered by the egalitarian
interaction pattern have been, up to now, rather modest in the NPM-ethics
debate. The NPM-critics have concentrated on the individualist aspects of
NPM, which were indeed the core of its rhetoric. Moreover, the recent
revival of the NPS is probably too young and not enough adopted in prac-
tice to bring about the sort of critical wave fostered by the individualist
NPM-reforms. On the basis of the theory the concerns can be expected to go
in two directions.
The first concerns focus on the proposition that the egalitarian interaction
pattern causes the three types of unethical behaviour associated with the
benevolence criterion. Hood (1998, p. 41) notes, for example, that egalitari-
anism within an organization might ‘degenerate into “coexistence”, with a
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tendency for each of the colleagues in the group to avoid asking awkward
questions about the behaviour of colleagues’. This is what the proposed
conceptual framework describes as ‘team-fetishism’ (table 2, cell 5). As for
egalitarianism between public servants and outsiders, those quality man-
agement measures that imply direct citizen- or employee-involvement in
decision making, can also be criticized, particularly from a TPA-perspective.
The argument then is that that kind of egalitarianism (as far as it is genuine
and not individualism in disguise, see above) can foster an excessive
application of the stakeholder orientation standard (table 2, cell 6) and thus
preferential treatment of citizens (table 2, cell 6).
A second concern is also most strongly maintained by TPA-arguments. It
parallels the proposition that egalitarianism can cause an excessive applica-
tion of the personal morality standard (table 2, cell 7), eventually leading to
anarchy or, in a more organized form, a Beamtenherrschaft. This obviously
echoes the concerns of Weber, Finer and many others about the potential
dangers for democracy of too much discretion for public servants. Dunleavy
and Hood (1994, p. 14) argued that one consequence of NPM-type reforms
might be the creation of a ‘headless chicken model’ (see also Rhodes 2000),
typified by a ‘no-one in charge public management’. They focused on the
interorganizational (macro-) level, but it is obvious that this is also a poten-
tial danger at the meso- and micro-levels.
Proposition 6: there is a reciprocal causal relationship between hierarchy
and the following unethical behaviour types: rule-fetishism (table 2, cell
8) and law- and principle-fetishism (table 2, cell 9).
Public administration and organizational theory have a long tradition of
critique on the hierarchist interaction pattern and its excesses or the
‘bureaupathologies’ (Van Wart and Denhardt 2001, p. 237). To cite just one
classic example, Merton describes how in a bureaucracy ‘[a]dherence to the
rules originally conceived as means, becomes transformed into an end-in-
itself ( . . . ). Formalism, even ritualism, ensues with an unchallenged insistence
upon punctilious adherence to formalized procedures’ (Merton 1968, p. 253;
cited in Denhardt 1994, p. 171). In the NPM-ethics debate as well, fierce crit-
icism has been expressed on the hierarchist interaction pattern, particularly
from the NPM and the NPS administrative philosophies. As for the former,
the whole NPM-rhetoric can be seen as an assault on the traditional hierar-
chist structure as being overpriced, underperforming and impeding the
implementation of profitable and worthwhile doctrines such as ‘hands-on’
entrepreneurial management or accountability for results. ‘Homiletic’ (Lynn
1996) works like Osborne and Gaebler (1992)’s classic Reinventing Govern-
ment contain numerous examples of the proposition that the hierarchist
interaction pattern leads to rule- (table 2, cell 8) and law- (table 2, cell 9)
fetishism. NPS-advocates essentially make the same empirical claim, but on
different normative grounds. They are mainly concerned about the
dehumanizing (Adams and Balfour 1998) and depersonalizing aspects of
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hierarchy. They criticize the hierarchist structure for allowing ‘an individual
to be a good administrator while committing acts of evil’ (p. 170) as well as
for its tendency to separate the bureaucrat from the morally conscious
human being. NPS-advocates emphasize that people should be conscious
that ‘the notion of individual ethical responsibility is not absolved by hier-
archical systems’ (Gawthrop 1998, p. 22).
Interestingly, most of the alternatives that are provided by the NPM-
authors also contain a considerable degree of hierarchy. Measures for
quality improvement, for example, not only include strong individualist
and some egalitarian elements, but also aim at improving and rationalizing
the processes in the organization and at introducing quality indicators. All
this includes a considerable degree of formalization, leading some to sug-
gest that NPM could be seen as a further step in the bureaucratization,
rather than a move away from it (Hood 1994, p. 138; Theobald 1997, p. 497).
Similarly, NPM-type reforms to give managers increased discretion, while
enhancing their ‘ex post’ accountability, can also include many hierarchist
elements. Commenting upon practices in New Zealand, Gregory and Hicks
(1999) observe that through the new contractualist regime, in fact ‘one type
of rules-based approach was replaced by another: impersonal bureaucratic
rules were increasingly replaced by personalized legal contracts’ (p. 12). The
NPM-advocates seem to assume that, although these and other proposals
include a significant degree of hierarchy, they will not lead to the kind of
unethical behaviour that they hypothesize to be caused by TPA’s hierarchist
practices.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of the paper was to bring conceptual clarity into the array of
diverse and non-cumulative claims about the causal relationship between
NPM-reforms and the ethics of public servants. This was done on the basis
of a conceptual framework. The basic argument of the paper then was that it
is possible to translate the empirical claims made by the advocates in the
NPM-ethics debate into the language of that framework and thus develop a
general and falsifiable theory about public servants’ ethics. It turned out that
the empirical claims of the four ‘rival’ positions in the debate were not rival,
but complementary. This somewhat paradoxical observation can be under-
stood by addressing the two types of biases that underlie each of the four
positions in the debate. First, as mentioned above, they are all four biased in
their perception. They tend to concentrate mainly on the beneficial effects
(that is, ethical decision making) of their preferred interaction type, while
developing something like a blind spot for the potential deficiencies (that is,
unethical behaviour). However, since the other approaches then point at
these deficiencies while focusing on the beneficial effects of their own
preferred interaction type, these claims aggregate to one coherent theory.
Second, when proponents of a particular approach do consider the potential
unethical behaviour associated with their preferred interaction pattern, they
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have a normative-ethical bias in the sense that they tend to evaluate the uneth-
ical behaviour associated with the other interaction patterns much more
negatively.
At the outset, it was observed that considerate public administrationists
would be more confused than helped by the diverse empirical claims in the
NPM-ethics literature. This article aimed to provide them with two prelimin-
ary answers, each of which requiring further development. First, the article
proposed an initial step towards a theory on the basis of which it should be
possible to predict the ethical decision making standards and types of
unethical behaviour associated with a particular interaction pattern.
Although each of the propositions is paralleled by claims in the NPM-ethics
literature, each of which usually supported by examples, the real test will be
in systematic empirical research. Survey research would be appropriate to
test the hypotheses, while qualitative case oriented research (Yin 1994)
would help to modify and expand the theory. Two basic case study designs
seem to be particularly appropriate for this purpose: a comparison of one
case (that is, organization) at different points in time (for example, compar-
ing ‘before’ and ‘after’ NPM-type changes) or a comparison between differ-
ent organizations (differing in their interaction types). The theory will also
need theoretical expansion. The discussion explicitly excluded questions
about the environment of the organization and its impact on organizational
processes and, ultimately, on the ethics of the organizational members,
because this aspect has been theorized more systematically (see for example
Romzek and Dubnick 1987; deLeon 1998; Dubnick 1998) than the impact of
intra-organizational interaction patterns on ethics. However, the impact of
the environment is obvious and needs to be included in an expanded version
of the theory. It can build on previous theoretical work of Romzek and
Dubnick (1987), deLeon (1998), grid-group theorists like Coyle (1997) and others.
Second, the article provided the practical advice that the dominance of a
single interaction pattern does increase the chance of the associated type of
unethical behaviour occurring. Hence, a public administrator should aim to
combine the three interaction types and hence combine doctrines from the
different approaches (discussed in the introduction), rather than single-
mindedly committing to one of them. In itself, there is nothing spectacular
about this advice to balance the different approaches. Indeed, the fourth
approach discussed in the introduction, Ethics Management, gives similar
advice. Even authors who are less explicit about combining approaches, do
consider doctrines of other approaches. Frederickson, for example, often
expresses a strong preference for the hierarchist interaction pattern (see for
example Frederickson 1999), but he also is sympathetic to NPS-type egalitar-
ian administrative doctrines (e.g. 1997). On the other side of the spectrum,
Borins (1999) clearly defends many individualist elements of NPM (for
example, competition, public entrepreneurship, ‘encouraging heroism’
(p. 286)), but complements this with egalitarian elements and advice to
‘inculcate values to guide the public sector’s would-be innovators’ (p. 385).
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Although it has these parallels in the NPM-ethics literature, the grid-
group theory advice to balance the three interaction types nevertheless does
have two additional advantages. First, by using a theoretically sound and
empirically useful typology, it does make the debate more subtle and
explicit, while still keeping it manageable. For example, its threefold typ-
ology is broader and more developed than the ‘compliance-integrity’ contin-
uum used by the Ethics Management proponents. Second, the link with
grid-group theory will also allow the NPM-ethics literature to build on the
literature about ‘clumsy institutions,’ which further grounds and develops
the vague advice to balance the different interaction patterns (Thompson
1997, 2002; Verweij forthcoming; 6 forthcoming). This is an emerging litera-
ture now evolving in promising directions.
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